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Introduction  
 
Though the rejection of the Treaty on the European Constitution in two member 
states’ referenda serves as a serious warning sign to all political decision-
makers, this issue must be separated from the scientific value that the Treaty 
generated and represents. This marks the politically attainable compromise at 
the level of the European Union today, and it could make the EU’s operation 
more transparent and democratic, and would end the confusion surrounding 
competencies. At the same time it could lay the constitutional, “public administra-
tive-institutional” and substantive law foundations for a new EU that progresses 
in a clearly staked out direction and also carries the possibility of a new quality 
of integration.  
 The French and Dutch referenda rejecting the Treaty were not about the 
above considerations: the European Constitutional Treaty has to be regarded as 
the communis opinio that will be unavoidable in the future, as it is considered 
a significant achievement both in political and scientific terms. Exploring the 
Constitutional Treaty–as the most recent “swallow” of European law–and its 
effect on the Hungarian constitutional order is therefore both practical and 
useful, even if this swallow has “not made a summer” (yet).  
 1. The European Constitutional Treaty appears to be the result of a fairly 
recent process–but here the appearance is deceiptive. It is true that the 29th 
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October 2004 signing of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) 
was preceded by the establishment of a European Convention based on the 
European Council’s December 2001 Laeken Declaration, and that the TCE’s 
draft took on its final form on 10th July 2003, thanks to the Convention’s rather 
intensive work. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the president of the Convention, 
presented the final product to the Italian Presidency-in-office. The Intergovern-
mental Conference beginning on 4th October 2003 debated the draft and then 
adopted it, and finally the TCE was signed on 9th October 2004 in Rome. 
 Were only a mere 22 months necessary for working out and passing the 
TCE? Obviously not. European law, especially European constitutional law, 
the science of public administration and political sciences have all worked over 
a decade in preparation of the signing, creation and designing of the TCE.  
 2. Already since the early 1990s a whole series of scholarly as well as 
practice-oriented conferences have focused on the necessity of creating a 
European constitution. Nothing illustrates the urgency of the problem better than 
the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights was designed before the TCE, 
so its text simply had to be inserted into the TCE. This process was also 
reinforced by the fact that member states’ constitutional courts (especially the 
German and Italian courts), encountered the problem of securing fundamental 
rights with increasing urgency, which–as I will analyse in more detail below–in 
turn brought up with growing urgency the issue of the relation between member 
states’ constitutions and European law, in other words the question of primacy.  
 3. It is impossible to make even a passing reference to each of the innu-
merable conferences and scientific as well as non-scientific communiqués issued 
on this subject. Let me just allude to the fact that in addition to the scientific 
analyses the European Parliament adopted a decision on 10th February 1994 
(„Resolution on the Constitution of the European Union”).1 In this decision–
which interestingly (even surprisingly), the 518 member Parliament adopted 
with an unconvincing majority (155 in favour, 87 opposed, 46 abstentions)–
the Parliament refers to its „repeated” request: the European Union needs a 
democratic constitution. In this context the decision noted with satisfaction 
that the Committee on Institutional Affairs had come up with a Draft Consti-
tution for the European Union.  
 From the scientific side a body called the European Constitutional Group 
presented its own draft constitution,2 but other groups, too, prepared expertises 
and drafts.3  
  
 1 Document A3-0064/94. OJ C 61, 10. 02. 1994. 155–170. February 10. O. J. 1994. 
 2 A Proposal for a European Constitution. Report by the European Constitutional 
Group. London, 1993. 
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 In 2001 the reputed T.M.C. Asser Institute in the Hague organised a conference 
which, looking into the future, focused on the impending enlargement, the 
accession of the 10 new Central Eastern European states and in this context 
also the issue of the European Constitution.4 
 In 2002 a broad analysis entitled „Europäisches Verfassungsrecht” was 
published5–to mention an arbitrarily selected example–which in part presents 
the theoretical dogmatic foundations of European constitutional law, and in 
part offers a perspective on future developments. The theoretical-dogmatic 
foundations touch upon complex issues of the constitutional legislator, feder-
alism, the institutions, sovereignty and the primacy of Union law, European 
constitutional jurisdiction, the EU’s and the EC’s constitutional relations, 
Union citizenship, basic rights, the economic constitution and the unusual term 
“competition-constitution” (Wettbewerbsverfassung). The future outlook analyses 
such basic issues as the problem of an EU situated at the intersection of the 
community’s and the member states’ legal systems, the legal structure of the 
EU as an association of states (Staatenverbund), and finally the prospective 
advantages of a European Constitution.  
 
 
I. On the need for a European constitution 
 
1. It has been communis opinio for quite a while now that the current Treaty 
establishing the European Community (will be referred to as TEC below) and 
the Treaty on European Union (TEU), are no longer sufficient as the constitu-
tional foundations of Union co-operation; instead of a “treaty-based constitution” 
there is a need for a real European constitution.  
 The notion of a “treaty-based constitution” refers to the fact that the EU 
does have a constitution already: the two Treaties, the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU), and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC). 
Based on the these two treaties the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has drawn out 
of the Community law those constitutional safeguards and constitutional 
principles based on which Community law began to function as constitutional 
                                                      
 3 The Shaping of a European Constitution. Report of the Working Group on the 
European Constitution. 1990; Kind, P.–Bosco, A. (eds.): A Constitution for Europe. London, 
1991. 
 4 Kellerman, A.–Jaap W. de Zwaan, Czuczai, J. (eds.): EU Enlargement. The Consti-
tutional impact at EU and National Level. The Hague, 2001. 
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law. In the ECJ’s application of law the TEC veritably began to fulfil the role of a 
constitutional charter. In the Court’s practice Community law began taking on the 
functions of a de facto constitution in terms of determining the relationship 
between member states and their citizens, as the Court interpreted (and on this 
basis applied) constitutional safeguards “into” their relationship with the EC.  
 2. The basis for providing safeguards to citizens/individuals was especially 
the direct effect of Community law which opened up the possibility of enforcing 
individual rights in the courts. We refer to safeguards such as rule of law 
(„Etat de droit”, „Rechtsstaat”): in its prominent and often-cited Les Verts 
decision6 the Court proclaimed that the requirement for rule of law was a 
foundation of the EC. Rule of law means that community or member state 
measures adopted in the EC must be in harmony with the EC’s „basic constitu-
tional charter, the Treaty” (i.e. the TEC). Deriving them from the member states’ 
constitutions, the ECJ recognised such principles as the fundamental components 
of the rule of law, as for instance due process the prohibition of discrimination, 
the defence of legitimate expectations the prohibition of retroactive effect, the 
requirement of proportional limitations and good faith in procedures 
 In addition to demanding the rule of law the ECJ also explicated the 
separation of powers, democratic governance, the right to judicial and the 
defence of fundamental rights, as well as defence of the four freedoms of the 
market as constitutional values.7 The specialised literature refers to this process 
as the „constitutionalisation” of Community law, at the same time pointing out 
that this is something different from the emergence of a nation state’s 
burgeoning constitution. Wechsler, for instance, refers to the TEC’s gradual, 
step-by-step, verdict-by-verdict transformation into a sui generis constitution 
by virtue of the ECJ’s application of it.8 
 3. Naturally this has its own story–as do the books, too („habent sua fata 
libelli”). The crystallisation of European constitutional principles in no small 
measure emerges amidst the concerned „frowning” of member states’ consti-
tutional courts.  
 3.1. The question arose in the context of how to interpret the primacy 
of European law in relation to the member states’ legal systems, especially 
  
 6 Case 294/83, Les Verts, [1986] European Court Review, 1339, 1365. 
 7 See for example. Petersmann, E.-U.: Proposals for a New Constitution for the 
European Union: Building-Blocks for a Constitutional Theory and Constitutional Law of 
the EU. Common Market Law Review, 1995, 1124. 
 8 Wechsler, B.: Der Europäische Gerichtshof in der EG-Verfassungswerdung [The 
European Court of Justice in the Genesis of the EC Constitution]. 1995. Cited in: 
Petersmann: op. cit. 1142. 
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constitutions and the constitutional rights and principles safeguarded by 
those.  
 The Italian9 and German10 constitutional courts both voiced their objections to 
the absolutist interpretation of the primacy of Community law which held that 
the latter is above the whole of the national member states constitutions, not 
only above a significant portion of the constitutional rules and the other 
internal legal regulations. 
 3.2. The Italian Constitutional Court pointed to the limits of the priority of 
Community law–as laid down and expounded by the European Court of 
Justice–set by the Italian constitution. In its Frontini verdict the court emphasised 
that even though overall Community law might be above the Italian consti-
tution, it certainly does not enjoy primacy over the constitution’s provisions 
regarding the inalienable rights of individuals and the constitution’s funda-
mental principles. Though Art. 11 of the Italian constitution does regulate the 
possibilities of transferring or limiting competencies, but at the same time the 
abovementioned fundamental rights and principles serve as „counterweights” and 
„counterlimits” (controlimiti) to this constitutional option. 
 In the Fragd decision (21st April 1989) the constitutional court reserved its 
right to review some regulations of Community law with regards to their 
compatibility with certain human rights articles of the Italian constitution.11  
 3.3. The German Federal Constitutional Court similarly asserted that Com-
munity law does not have absolute primacy with respect to certain fundamental 
rights protections enshrined in the German Basic Law–as long as Community 
law does not offer a similar measure of protections; the constitutionality of 
Community law will be reviewed with respect to the standards laid down by 
the Grundgesetz (the German constitution). In its famous Solange I verdict the 
Federal Constitutional Court stated that the Grundgesetz’s fundamental law 
guarantees enjoy priority as “as long as (solange) the competent organs of the 
Community have not removed the conflict of norms”… between Community 
  
 9 On the primacy of community law see: Várnay, E.– Papp, M.: Az Európai Unió joga 
[The Law of the European Union]. Budapest, 2005. 82. For the decisions of Italian 
constitutional court see: de Witte, B.: Constitutional Aspects of European Union Member-
ship in the Original Six Member States: Model Solution for the Applicant Countries? In: 
EU-Enlargement. op. cit.74. 
 10 For the “Solange” decisions see for example BverfGE 73, 339. The most recent 
relevant decision is: BverfG, 2 BvL 1/97. Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht. 
2000. 702. For the Maastricht decision see. BVerfGE 89, 155. Also see: Várnay–Papp: op. 
cit. 307–312. 
 11 Gaja, G.: New Developements in a Continuing Story: The Relationship between 
EEC Law and Italian Law. Common Market Law Review, 1990, 83. 
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law and the basic law safeguards contained within the Grundgesetz “in 
accordance with the Treaty mechanism”. This means that the Community 
law’s primacy is not unconditional, absolute primacy, but merely conditional. 
In the 1986 Solange II decision the Federal Constitutional Court observed with 
relief: given the European Commission’s practice regarding human rights and 
general level of the protection of fundamental rights, the introduction of direct 
elections to the European Parliament, as well as the fact that all member states 
joined the European Convention on Human Rights, it finds the situation 
satisfactory “…as long as (solange) the European Communities, and in particular 
the case law of the European Court, generally ensure, an effective protection of 
fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the communities which 
is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of human rights 
required unconditionally by the Grundgesetz…” The Federal Constitutional 
Court will not make use of its powers in the sense of deciding upon the 
applicability of secondary community legislation by member states’ courts 
with reference to the German Grundgesetz. In other words the Federal Consti-
tutional Court found that the situation that had emerged (unlike the situation at 
the time of the Solange I decision) bore no probability of a conflict of norms 
Community law and the constitutional, especially fundamental right safeguards 
of the Grundgesetz.  
 3.4. In de Witte’s interpretation these statements denote the thesis of 
relative primacy of Community law over member states’ constitutions and thus 
they deny the notion of absolute primacy.  
 4. En route towards the „constitutionalisation” of Community law a crucial 
stepping stone was marked by the assertion of the TEU Art. 6 (2) that the EU 
respects fundamental rights. In the instance the TEU refers to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the general principles of Community law, as 
well as to member states’ common constitutional traditions.  
 4.1. In view of the above it cannot be regarded as a coincidence, but rather 
as a significant step in the coherent process of development that the EU 
decided on drafting its own Charter of Fundamental Rights. Nonetheless, this 
was not always an obvious choice: the drafting of the Charter was accom-
panied by doubts.  
 4.2. The question that arose was whether drafting a European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights would in fact increase citizens’ fundamental rights as 
compared to the current situation? The answer was not unequivocal. In Weiler’s 
poignant analysis12 the Europeans are becoming nauseated by the protection of 
  
 
12
 Weiler, J.: Europe 2000–The Constitutional Agenda. An Outline. In: EU Enlarge-
ment. op. cit. 10. 
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fundamental rights: they are protected by the member states’ constitutional 
and regular courts, by the European Convention on Human Rights and its 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg and by the European Com-
mission. The Commission stated already in 1969 that it finds all community 
measures that infringe upon the member states’ common constitutional 
tradition unacceptable. Thus primarily one would have to clarify the legal 
policy goals of such a charter; its undeniable advantage would be that it would 
make comprehensible and tangible even for the „man of the streets” what so 
far only jurists–and even among those only a select group–sense and under-
stand. For this very reason Weiler thinks that the creation of the charter might 
backfire. It could offer a loophole to avoid undertaking anything in this area, in 
other words it would merely offer an excuse to evade taking necessary steps. 
In reality the European Community does not have a human rights and funda-
mental rights policy and that is the real problem. What is needed is not the 
formalisation of rights, but the formulation of a policy for the enforcement and 
institutionalisation of fundamental rights.  
 The best counterexample to this is community competition policy. Arts 81–
82 of the TEC provide the basis of community competition law and therein 
the guarantee of the internal market’s unity. Obviously these articles would be 
hardly more than rhetoric if the Directorate General No. 4 were not engaged in 
enforcing these rules. In fact since the introduction of EC Regulation 1/2003–as is 
well-known–with the decentralisation of the enforcement of competition law 
the member states’ competition authorities (European Competition Network–
ECN) and courts have also become involved in implementing the provisions of 
the two articles.  
 The situation regarding fundamental rights is similar: it is hardly possible 
to rely on the courts in this area, as the continuous monitoring of violations, 
the gathering of information, conducting inquiries or potential „investigations” 
cannot be a task for the courts, but has to be within the purview of an organi-
sation established for this purpose.  
 4.3. Similarly, we must also face up to the fact that from a functional 
perspective the ECJ’s current institutional/organisational system is not 
completely capable of enforcing fundamental rights. Though the ECJ’s justices 
are excellent jurists, few are constitutional lawyers per se. The real problem 
stems from the fact–and this is where the shadow of new „Maastricht 
decisions” looms–that it may be within the context of an ECJ decision that the 
primacy enjoyed by European law over even the most important fundamental 
rights, and the associated principles and rules guaranteed by member states, 
are enforced. This, the total subordination of member states’ basic law 
regulation to European law, is problematic and may substantially violate member 
12 IMRE VÖRÖS 
  
states’ constitutional „sensibilities”. In the final analysis, Weiler13 points out–
the ECJ’s relation to the member states’ courts is rather a lot more complex and 
of a different nature than the legal standing of the House of Lords or the US 
Supreme Court in the respective countries’ constitutional order.14 Weiler thus 
concludes that a separate European constitutional court would be necessary, 
which could exclusively address issues of constitutional law and thus concentrate 
on those without dividing its attention among complex internal market, economic, 
competition law, etc., problems, among which constitutional jurisdiction would 
be only one of several issues.  
 4.4. As is commonly known the body charged with drafting the Charter 
worked out its proposal under the chairmanship of Roman Herzog, formerly 
president of the German Constitutional Court and then German head of state, 
and presented its Charter of Fundamental Rights which the intergovernmental 
conference at Nice accepted on 7th December 2000. In the process of drafting 
the TCE the Charter of Fundamental Rights was then integrated into the 
document as its Part II.  
 5. The „constitutionalisation” of Community law could therefore be regarded 
as a process taking place under a kind of member state compulsion. 
 The primacy of Community law cannot be enforced absolutely, if for 
instance basic law safeguards are insufficient; its relativity on the other hand 
opens the door to those objections–as formulated in the abovementioned Italian 
and German constitutional court statements–that primacy exists only in so far 
as Community law provides the same level of protection as member states’ 
constitutions do. If this is not the case, then constitutional courts reserve the right 
to potentially declare–according to their own constitutional standards–certain 
provisions of Community law unconstitutional, thus effectively ordering lower 
courts in the given member state not to apply it. It is obvious that this line of 
reasoning implies a judicial review of Community law by the constitutional 
courts of member states: in effect these bodies can „destroy” Community law 
depending on whether it is consistent with their own constitution; in this case 
Community law will not enjoy primacy in the given member state.  
 The EU was thus under pressure to act: drafting a European constitution 
including safeguards of fundamental rights became inevitable.15  
  
 
13
 Ibid. 8. 
 14 Ibid. 8. 
 15 Gordos, Á.–Ódor, B.: Their book entitled Az Európai Alkotmányos Szerződés szüle-
tése [(The Birth of the European Constitutional Treaty). Budapest, 2004.] offers useful 
information on the circumstances of the European Constitution’s creation without the 
difficult dogmatic background above, and also provides a wealth of information on the 
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 6. Still, the debate on the necessity of a constitution continued to rage in 
2001. On the one hand the phenomenon referred to as „democratic deficit”, the 
lacking legitimacy, was indisputable, as was apparent that the Treaties could not 
function as real constitutions. The Treaties were too detailed, frequently 
overlapping, while at the same time from a constitutional legal standpoint they 
were not differentiated enough. Ultimately, the Union’s competencies can only 
be limited–that is obstacles to the indefinite expansion of these competencies 
can only be erected–by the way of a constitution. 
 6.1. Even in light of the above, there was still controversy surrounding the 
question of whether it was really necessary to formally create a separate, newly 
worded constitution to address these issues. (An ironic reference comes from 
Weiler, who titles one of the sections in his study „Does Europe Need a 
Constitution?”, while casting doubt on the idea in the next section’s title: 
„Does Europe really need a Constitution?”16). Weiler believes that a formal 
constitution would also introduce a formal legislative hierarchy that would 
deprive European constitutional development of the very advantage that stems 
from its essence, its peculiar feature deriving from singular historical circum-
stances: flexibility. The democratic deficit and other problems ought not to 
be necessarily addressed by drafting a constitution. It would be sufficient to 
separate the TEU’s and TEC’s constitutional parts par excellence, while 
preserving the non-constitutional parts as „normal” Community law.  
 6.2. The fundamental challenge that nonetheless needs to be addressed 
constitutionally is the question of proportion between intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism. In reality this is the basic issue underlying the institutional 
reform proposals of successive intergovernmental conferences. Developing 
the EU is a rather paradox process. Wouters, for instance, sees a shift 
towards the intergovernmental feature at the expense of supranationalism. In 
his opinion the Council of Ministers continues to gain ground at the expense of 
the Commission, a case in point is the memorable participation of an 
extremist party in the Austrian conservative-led government, when the 
diplomatic measures taken by the Union were not handled by the Commission, 
but outside the institutional structure of the EU.17  
 6.3. Even though it is possible to argue with the observation above, the 
issue of intergovernmentalism/supranationalism was always–and presumably 
                                                      
Hungarian government’s position on the relevant issues, as well as the work of the 
Hungarian representatives at the convention.  
 16 Weiler: op. cit. 5. 
 17 Wouters, J.: Institutional and Constitutional Challenges for the European Union–
Some Reflections in the Light of the Treaty of Nice. In: EU Enlargement… op. cit. 45. 
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will be in the foreseeable future–one of the basic questions of the EU’s develop-
ment strategy. The magic word can probably be found in the dichotomy of 
increasing democratic legitimacy versus efficient functioning. In this context 
Wouters points to possibilities such as the appointment of ECJ justices. This is 
a sensitive issue that no matter how far it strays from the abovementioned 
“magic word” is still inseparably tied to it: it is an indication of lacking 
democratic legitimacy that there is no democratic control over the appointment 
process and thus it is impossible to guarantee that a judge inducted into the 
body will fulfil all the conditions laid down in TEC Art. 223, in terms of his 
independence or expertise.  
 6.4. There is also a lot to be done in terms of the transparency of EU 
institutions to European citizens. Though the modifications introduced by 
the Amsterdam Treaty–for instance TEC Art. 255’s new text–called for 
guaranteeing citizens’ right of access to documents and other data, in reality 
the exercise of this right is conditional on general principles, so in practice the 
right of access is rarely enforced.18 In other words the exceptions need to be 
narrowed and the exercise of this right needs to be expanded. The ECJ played 
an important role in this area (as well)–especially in the Netherlands v. Com-
mission case19–in the “constitutionalisation” of European law. This case and 
the ECJ’s practice are good examples illustrating how the ECJ fits the member 
states’ common constitutional traditions into the EU’s constantly evolving 
“constitutional law.”  
 6.5. The abovementioned democratic legitimacy/democratic deficit and the 
associated problems of rule of law, the more precise demarcation of competencies 
and the issue of re-evaluating the role of member states’ parliaments all 
contributed a great deal to the TCE’s drafting.  
 6.5.1. Democratic legitimacy fares best in the co-decision procedure. Still, this 
is the area where the most demands for progress came in. Wouters specifically 
called attention to the possibility that the European Parliament’s role ought to 
be increased: the Nice Treaty, for its part, did not ensure parallel to the 
introduction of the qualified majority voting in the Council that it would also 
be tied to a co-decision procedure, or at least that there would be the possibility 
of obligatory consultation for the European Parliament.20 There is no such 
requirement for the fiscal policy or monetary rules concerning the euro zone, 
nor for trade in intellectual property. The situation is even worse as far as the 
second pillar is concerned, though somewhat better in the third.  
  
 18 Wouters: ibid. 45. 
 19 Case C-58/94 Netherlands v. Council [1996] European Court Review,  I-2169. 
 20 Wouters: op. cit. 48. 
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 6.5.2. The question of rule of law also raises concerns that provided 
important arguments in favour of drafting and adopting the TCE. The ECJ in 
its previously mentioned Les Verts decision and in subsequent decisions 
emphasised that if we consider the EC or the EU to have rule of law, then 
this implies–in fact assumes–that there is a system of legal remedies and 
procedures at the Union level, which neither the EU nor the member states can 
circumvent, in as far as the review of the legality of the Union’s own acts–
compared to Community law–is concerned.21 Given that such a requirement 
implies the comparison of community’s and member states’ process of 
legislation with European law, this practically means the formulation of a 
requirement for constitutional jurisdiction of sorts. Even though–as we have seen–
the ECJ has fulfilled this role almost since its inception and has developed 
European constitutional principles in the process, including especially the 
enforcement of basic rights, the obligation for implementing the rule of law 
will evidently necessitate a set of requirements that extend beyond what has 
been established hitherto. One such question was in how far individuals can 
turn directly to the ECJ for the purpose of enforcing their rights–the ECJ’s 
stance on the TEC Art. 230’s standing rules is arguably too strict in comparison. 
Obviously this is about fundamental questions the answers to which–given the 
deeply constitutional and basic rights nature of the issue–cannot be left (even 
in part) to the ECJ’s practice.22  
 6.5.3. Similarly the TCE drafting was also instigated by the need for a more 
precise demarcation of competencies between the EU and the member states. 
The multi level governance system appeared worthy of consideration. It implies 
that responsibility be distributed by domains and tasks, divided between different 
actors who are connected–while sufficiently preserving and securing their 
autonomy–by efficient institutional links.23 
 6.5.4. The unsolved issue of the relationship between member states’ 
parliaments and the European Parliament was also raised, of course. This 
delicate matter naturally did not come up in the context of modifying or 
reducing the European Parliament’s prerogatives in any way. Parliament (TEC 
Art. 189) consists of representatives of the Community’s member states and is 
thus one of the most efficient repositories of political democracy.  
  
 21 Case 294/83 Les Verts v. Parliament [1986] European Court Review, 1339; also see 
Case C-2/88 IMM Zwartveld [1990] European Court Review, I-3365. 
 22 See for example Wouters: op. cit. 49. 
 23 Ibid. 52. 
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 Suggestions to make Parliament bicameral,24 however (it was not hard to 
detect that the model for this idea stemmed from the German and Austrian 
federal parliaments), illustrate the problem well in spite of their stunning 
nature. A second chamber would–in Wouters’ opinion–not reduce Parliament’s 
authority, of course, but rather turn the Council of Ministers into some sort of 
second chamber, the membership of which would consist of representatives 
from the member states’ governments. The practices used in the co-decision 
procedure demonstrate, however, that the Council of Ministers–at least from 
a constitutional/theoretical perspective–already works as a kind of second 
chamber. In such a system the first chamber would be home to directly elected 
popular representatives, while the second chamber–and here the example of 
the German/Austrian, even the American federal system is apparent–would 
represent territorial/regional governmental interests, as a second chamber 
constituted on a territorial principle.  
 6.6. It is indisputable that the problems and ideas above, raised merely by the 
way of example–regardless of how much or in which form they found their way 
into the TCE–significantly influenced and in some cases and contexts even 
forced the inclusion of certain ideas into the document.  
 
 
II. The TCE’s content and its main features 
 
The TCE consists of a preamble and four parts. These are complemented by 36 
protocols and two annexes.  
 The Preamble and the first two parts are really the TCE’s constitutional content.  
1.1. Part I–unlike the others–does not have its own title, even though it 
contains the rules concerning the Union’s nature, its self-specification, 
organisation and operation.  
 Part I is divided into nine titles: Title I addresses the Union’s definition and 
objectives, Title II recognises fundamental rights and deals with Union 
citizenship, IV details the institutional framework and bodies of the EU, the 
fifth title concerns the exercise of the Union’s competencies (including the 
Union’s legislative system, the common foreign, security and defence policy, 
the rule of law, the solidarity of member states and enhanced co-operation), 
Title VI bears the name „Democratic Life of the Union”, while Title VII 
addresses finances, VIII good neighbourhood relations, and the final title, 
number IX dwells on Union membership.  
  
 24 Ibid. 53; See also: Horváth, Z.–Ódor, B.: Az Európai Unió Alkotmánya. [The 
Constitution of the European Union]. Budapest, 2005. 28. 
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 1.2. Part II incorporates the Charter of Fundamental Rights adopted earlier.  
 1.3. Part III deals with Union policies and their operation.  
 1.4. Part IV contains general and closing dispositions.  
 The protocols and annexes following the four parts occasionally touch 
upon very important basic issues, such as the role of national parliaments in 
the EU, the ECJ’s statutes, or the protocol laying down the procedure to be 
followed in the case of excessive deficits.  
 2. With respect to its structure the TCE has thus fulfilled expectations: it 
puts into a well-arranged, clear system… 
 – the EU’s fundamental objectives and values–including the fundamental 
rights–, its organisational and operational order, as well as 
– the EU’s policies.7 
 There are two essential areas in which the TCE’s content can be grouped.  
 3. In terms of content the TCE bring changes of great importance: even if its 
only role had been to formulate–for the first time in the history of European 
integration–in a generally comprehensive manner the rules in all those areas that 
the TEU and the TEC address, than it still would have been worth drafting. The 
overly complex, inscrutable mass of statutes burdened by numerous instances of 
overlapping primary law is now being replaced by clear regulations that–at least 
to a certain degree–enable the average citizen to find out what the EU is, if he so 
wishes.  
 Selecting any of the many important changes in the TCE is inevitably bound 
to be arbitrary. Accepting this risk we would like to call attention to the following: 
 – the EU’s basic goals reflect the transition from initial economic integration–
the creation and maintenance of a unified internal market, that is the establish-
ment of a certain level of economic union–to political integration (Art. I-3);  
 – the TCE proclaims the EU’s legal personality (Art. I-7), which 
simultaneously abolishes the–undeniably complicated, but given the continu-
ously ongoing development inevitable–three pillar structure.  
 – In this context the TCE also lays down the rules for withdrawing from 
the Union (Art. I-60) 
 – it clearly (with the high standards one expects from a real constitution) 
settles the relations between the EU and member states declaring the equality 
of member states before the TCE (Art. I-5); 
 – finally establishes in a written legal statute the primacy of Union law 
over member state law (Art. I-6) . 
 – the clear tabulation of the EU’s competencies (Title III, Arts I-11–18); 
 – in a structural/institutional context the TCE establishes the permanent 
position of an European Council President (I-22), as well as that of a Union 
Minister for Foreign Affairs (I-28); 
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 – the TCE achieves a veritable breakthrough with its reform of decision-
making procedures: it limits the number of those areas in which unanimity is 
required (in effect curtailing the scope of member state vetoes) and creates the 
institution of qualified majority, the so-called dual majority, in the decision-
making process (Art. I-25); 
 – the TCE gives greater weight to the European Parliament by expanding 
its competencies (Art. I-46 provides the basis); 
 – it introduces the institution of popular initiative [Art. I-47 (4)], as a 
manifestation of participatory democracy; 
 – the TCE’s Part II includes among its constitutional provisions the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights with its enumerated basic rights–which is absolutely 
essential for any document aspiring to the rank of a constitution–, thus pre-
empting the abovementioned potential source of friction between the EU and 
member states’ constitutional courts.  
 4. Though in terms of its legal classification the TCE is a treaty between 
subjects of international law, and can only be modified with their consent and 
through consensus, it was nonetheless undoubtedly created with the intention 
of setting up a constitution.  
 When we are asked to take a position on the question whether this could be 
considered a constitution in the traditional constitutional law sense of the 
word, then it certainly appears to be a waste of words–one might say hair-
splitting–to look for the attributes of a nation-states’ constitution in this document. 
This is a unique process in European history whose legal, constitutional 
representation cannot be undertaken with traditional legal or constitutional 
categories. Undoubtedly, a traditionally understood constitution would have to 
talk of a traditionally understood sovereign state and, correspondingly, of the 
people constituting it, who are the source of said sovereignty. In this context 
we cannot talk of a state-constituting people–the European people. But this 
does not imply that the TCE, in its own specific range of tasks, in the very 
specific, historically determined set of problems it needs to address, could not 
fulfil the function of a basic law, or to put it better: a „Basic Law”.  
 The TCE determines the constitutional framework for those fundamental 
questions that are not handled by primary legislation: the TEU and the TEC, 
which would be repealed once the TCE takes effect (the Euratom Treaty is the 
only one that would not be affected by the TCE’s potential adoption). The EU is 
not a „state” in the traditional sense and thus the debate whether it can be made 
to fit the “confederation of states” or “federal state” mould seems nonsensical. 
The EU is genuinely a sui generis formation, with the intermediate characterisa-
tion „invented” by the German Federal Constitutional Court (a kind of neither 
this nor that): the „Staatenverbund”. Correspondingly this non-traditional forma-
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tion of states cannot have a traditionally understood constitution, but it can have a 
„constitutional treaty” based on an international treaty between the member states.  
 This peculiarity is well expressed in the compromise name that the 
document finally received: „Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe”. 
 The category and institution of the „treaty-based constitution”–introduced 
and analysed above (see I.1)–as a living, already practically existing “consti-
tution” (within the conceptual framework outlined above), cannot be immediately 
replaced by a “real” constitution as it is traditionally understood, with all the 
regular features of a constitution, for that would require a federal state that is 
compatible with traditional constitutional law categories. At the current stage 
of development there is no sign of such a state, however. The TCE’s undoubtedly 
small, but at the same time determined and significant steps in this direction 
cannot change the fact of lacking sui generis state formation. The “Constitu-
tional Treaty” replacing the “treaty-based constitution” captures the complexity 
of the integration process, its historically unique nature, even at the level of a 
wordplay, and it also expresses the notion that in the given situation this 
“product” best represents the reality of the attainable level of integration–now 
and in the foreseeable future as well.  
 In our opinion the TCE therefore–with all its compromises–adequately 
reflects the current state of economic and political development: the state in 
which the EU–consisting of economic and political union–is right now and 
will be in the foreseeable future and medium term.  
 This is not only no small achievement, but also the attainable maximum–if 
it is attainable at all in light of the integration process. But not even the TCE 
itself sees this as the end of the road.  
 5. The Preamble clearly expresses the nature of the European unification 
process: Paragraphs (2)–(3)–(4) („wishes to deepen”; „united ever more closely”; 
„…continue the work accomplished within the framework of the Treaties 
establishing the European Communities and the Treaty on European Union, by 
ensuring the continuity of the Community acquis,”) all indicate that integration 
is on the path of preservation through cancellation.25 The TCE’s goal is thus 
not to finally conclude for the long-term a continuously evolving process–and 
it could not do that even if it wished to do so–but to further develop the results 
  
 25 See the TCE’s critical analysis in: Czuczai, J.: Some Points Concerning the EU Consti-
tution from a Hungarian Perspective. In: Curtin, D.–Kellermann, A. E.–Blockmans, S. (eds.): 
The EU Constitution: The Best Way Forward? T. M. C. Asser Institut. The Hague, 2005. 
433–445; on the preservation through cancellation: Szigeti, P.: Az Európai Alkotmányszer-
ződés hatása a Köztársaság Alkotmányára [The European Constitutional Treaty’s Impact 
on the Constitution of the Republic]. Special edition. 225. 
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accomplished so that a Union of 25 will be capable of flexibly serving the goal 
of integration at least in the medium-term.  
 5.1. Though the TCE was criticised immediately following its adoption for 
being “overly centralised”, the truth is that it preserves the intergovernmental 
nature of the development process–the TCE is an international treaty that can 
only be amended unanimously, based on a consensus of all member states. The 
Preamble [Paragraph 4] talks of a Europe “United in diversity”, making clear 
that unified Europe is based on the preservation of the member states’ national 
identity [Preamble Paragraph 3].  
 These are not just the typical generalities common in preambles: Part I, 
Title I, Art. I-1–that is the TCE’s first rule on establishing the Union–clearly 
states the EU’s competencies are derived from the member states who confer 
on the Union their own competencies, which in turn practices it on a 
“Community basis”. 
 5.2. The second notion in the Preamble is the strengthening of democracy 
and transparency in the EU’s public life–and the TCE does indeed live up to 
these expectations.  
 5.3. The Preamble finally refers to the values that the EU subscribes to and 
then later details in Part I Title I Art. I-2: the TCE begins with a commitment 
to the values of human rights, democracy, equality and the rule of law. These 
values are complemented in Art. I-2 by the individual rights of persons 
belonging to minority communities, pluralism, a general prohibition of 
discrimination, tolerance, social justice, solidarity, as well as the declaration of 
gender equality.   
 6. The TCE’s “individual” boundaries are set by the fact that the European 
Union established by this Treaty (Art. I-1) is successor to the current EU and 
the EC (Art. IV-438). Correspondingly, with the taking effect of the TCE, the 
TEU and the TEC are repealed, as are the Accession Treaties. Separate 
detailed rules regulate the issue of territorial scope.  
 7.1. In addition to the EU’s aforementioned values we also find the 
summary rules concerning the EU objectives here – many of which we have 
already encountered in the context of the TEC introductory regulations. One 
such goal is, for instance, the well-being of its peoples. Aside from such 
general statements we also find a statement on the “two unions”: Art. I-3 (2) 
includes among the Union’s objectives the notion that the EU is an area with 
both, political union (without internal frontiers, with freedom, security and 
justice), and economic union (an internal market where competition is free and 
undistorted). These two constitute the real EU, the summary term for which is 
the “European Union”.  
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 The common feature of the two partial unions is that they seek to realise a 
social market economy, promoting social solidarity, economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity between the member states.  
 7.2. It is important to point out that the TCE puts a great deal of emphasis 
on the rule of law, as one of the fundamental attributes of the EU: up to Art. I-
3 this category is mentioned thrice, in the Preamble, in Art. I-2, and in Art. I-3, 
(2) listing the EU objectives. It is obvious here that this is not merely the TEU, 
the TEC or the acquis which “show up again”, but the member states’ common 
constitutional traditions as well. The text’s emphasis, however, is to set 
fundamental conditions concerning potential future enlargements, which–due 
to their safeguard character–(rightly) raise the bar very high for potential new 
member states and candidate countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, but 
especially Turkey). Though as an aside one could point out that there are 
sources of law that not only fail to satisfy these requirements but–we shall 
return to this below–straight-out contradict them.  
 7.3. The clear, comprehensible repetition of the four freedoms is–finally!–
mentioned together with the prohibition of discrimination.  
 7.4. Art. I-5 of the TCE states another well-known proposition: the principle 
of member state’s obligation to co-operate [Art. I-5, (2)], but this is preceded 
by the statement on the equality of member states before the “Constitution”–
this is how the TCE refers to itself at this point!–, as well as the respect for 
their national identities [Paragraph 1].  
 7.5. Art. I-6 finally declares the primacy of Union law: what this means is 
the primacy of the law “adopted by the institutions of the Union in exercising 
competences conferred on it” over the legal order of the member states. The 
TCE does not mention the relationship between its own provisions and the 
member states’ constitutions–leaving this “thorny delicacy” to the member 
states’ constitutional legislators. As is known, the Republic of Hungary has 
significant outstanding debts in this area–the primacy of European law over 
the Hungarian Constitution ought to finally laid down in the Constitution. 
Unless this happens the issue cannot be regarded as concluded. We will return 
to this issue further below, as with the TCE’s potentially entry into force 
settling this long-delayed question may become completely inevitable for the 
Hungarian constitutional legislator.26  
  
 26 For further information see: Vörös, I.: Az EU-csatlakozás alkotmányjogi: jogdog-
matikai és jogpolitikai aspektusai [The constitutional, legal dogmatic and legal policy 
aspects of EU accession]. Jogtudományi Közlöny, 57 (2002) 397; Kecskés, L.: Magyar-
ország EU-csatlakozásának alkotmányossági problémái és a szükségessé vált alkotmány-
módosítás folyamata. [The constitutional problems of Hungary’s EU accession and the 
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 7.6. Art. I-7 declares the EU’s legal personality, thus the Union become a 
subject of international law. 
 7.7. Title II of Part I, referring to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
contained in Part II, recognizes basic rights–with two clarifications. On the one 
hand the TCE additionally also refers to the European Convention on Human 
Rights, as well as the common constitutional tradition of member states. This 
means that in applying and interpreting the Charter of Fundamental Rights–the 
TCE’s Part II–these two legal texts have to be considered.  
 The fundamental rights, if properly applied and interpreted, are therefore 
part of the Union’s legal order. 
 What this means is that in applying Union law one always has to pay 
attention to fundamental rights, as those constitute the fundament of the whole 
European legal order as its core principles. In our opinion their classification as 
core principle means that Part II, containing the fundamental rights, on the one 
hand also incorporates concrete applicable measures, and on the other hand–as 
supplementary feature in the case of loopholes, for instance–is also a repository 
of general principles that ought to be considered when applying European law. 
The basic rights are therefore the lex generalis of European legal order, which 
influence the application and interpretation of any lex speciali.  
 7.8. The TCE’s beneficial effect is inestimable in the sense that it subsumes 
the first two of the three effective treaties (TEU, TEC, Euratom Treaty), in a 
single “treaty”, thus repealing them (the Euratom Treaty is not affected by the 
TCE). The Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty) 
lapsed on 23rd July 2002 as the fifty years its validity had been envisioned for 
had expired, but the majority of its provisions live on in the TEC.27  
 This means that the EU’s primary law becomes codified in a single 
document, which marks a fundamental change in terms of its effects. The 
European legal order, the EU’s structure, institutions and operations have 
become transparent, clearer and more easily comprehensible. This is reinforced 
by Art. IV-438 which pronounces succession: the successor of the EU and the 
EC established by the TEU is the EU established by the TCE:  
 The situation of secondary law is different: those remain in force. The same 
applies for other elements of the acquis, as well as the ECJ’s and the Court of 
First Instance’s decisions, which continue to preserve their source of law 
character.  
                                                      
process of the constitutional amendments necessitated thereby]. Európai Jog, 2003/ Nos. 1 
and 3., 21–30. and 22–23. 
 27 See Horváth–Ódor: Az Európai Unió Alkotmánya. op. cit. 58. 
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 8. The TCE brings significant changes: simplification and increased trans-
parency in the system of sources of law. Title I Chapter I talks of the Union’s 
legal acts within the framework of “Common Provisions”, and significantly 
simplifies the extremely complex, nigh inscrutable system. The TCE’s articles 
I-33–I-39 introduce four legally binding and two legally non-binding so-called 
legal acts. Dogmatically it is odd that the TCE does not refer to the legislative 
system but to “acts”, and it is odder still that it distinguishes between legally 
binding and non-binding acts. It would be a substantial error if the text were to 
talk about legally non-binding sources of law, but the designations of “acts” 
benevolently conceals the dogmatic slip-up. We return to the problem later to 
analyse its effect on the Hungarian constitution.  
 A legally binding act is the European law (which corresponds to the current 
first pillar regulation), the European framework law (“successor” to the 
directive)–these so-called legislative acts [Art. I-33 (1)] have general applicability.  
 A European regulation differs from legislative acts in that it serves their 
implementation and thus, depending on which law’s implementation it was 
issued to serve, it could have ‘European law’ content, that is immediately binding 
content, or it could have “framework law” content, meaning in essence that it 
only obliges member states to pursue certain goals but leaves the choice of 
adequate tools up to them.  
 The European decision is not necessarily generally, but a binding executive 
act. A decision can designate specific addressees, and in such a case it is 
only binding for them.  
 The TCE preserves the institutions of legally binding recommendations and 
opinions, but through enshrining them in the constitution it inaugurates them 
as constitutional institutions. According to the position delineated by the 
Hungarian Constitution and the Hungarian Constitutional Court this is a very 
worrisome practice; we will return to our concern about the integration of 
these institutions into the constitution further below.  
 9. We will not delve further into the TCE’s detailed contents, as the 
objective of the present study is not to provide a full commentary on the TCE 
but to assess its likely effects. Beyond the abovementioned effects we will 
therefore in a separate study concentrate on some specific problems, with 
special attention to their impact and mutual feedback effects on the Hungarian 
Constitution and the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. 
 
 
